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EUROPE AND MUSLIMS-EUROPEANS: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION OF IDENTITY/IDENTITIES

Amir Karić

Pravni fakultet, Univerzitet u Tuzli
Muhameda Hevaija Uskufija 7, 75000 Tuzla

ABSTRACT

Consideration of this topic often indicates that the identities of Europe and Muslims in Europe are considered to be closed and static categories. After defining what is meant by the term identity, this paper points out the fact that Europe and Muslims in it are not monolithic entities, that they have polyvalent and historically pervading identities. Certain differences in self-perception among European peoples are presented, as well as differences among different populations of Muslim Europeans. The paper concludes by pointing out the importance of separating cultural identity as a private sphere (civil society sphere) and political identity as a public sphere.

Key terms: Europe, Muslims, identity, culture

SAŽETAK

Razmatranja ove teme često ukazuju da se identitet Evrope kao i muslimana u Evropi smatraju zatvorenim i statičnim kategorijama. Poslije određenja šta se podrazumijeva pod pojmom identitet, u ovom radu se ukazuje na činjenicu da Evropa i muslimani u njoj nisu monolitni entiteti, da imaju polivalentne, a historijski gledano i međusobno prožimajuće identitete. Predstavljene su određene razlike u autopercepciji među evropskim narodima, kao i razlike među različitim populacijama muslimana evropljana. U završnici rada se ukazuje na značaj razdvajanja kulturnog identiteta kao privatne sfere (sfere civilnog društva) i političkog identiteta kao javne sfere.

Ključne riječi: Evropa, muslimani, identitet, kultura

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"We live in the illusion that the identity is one and indivisible, whereas it is always unitas multiplex. We are all multi-identity beings." (Edgar Morin, Penser l'Europe)

I

Destroyed in World War II, West Europe desperately needed workforce that would work on reconstructing destroyed cities and on building infrastructure, while people in underdeveloped countries, many of which were Muslim, at this same time searched for better wages and better future.[1] A result of these two needs were several millions of Muslims in West Europe.

For a number of years, Europeans were not concerned about accepting their new fellow citizens, believing they would go back to their original countries once the hard work was over. This is why European countries did not have any integration policies at all. However, after forty years of heavy labour, these workers would not go away, particularly their children, who were born and grew up in European countries.

Eventually, discussions about integration were open. For some people, integration meant assimilation, implying the immersion of minority cultures in majority ones in order to preserve monocultural society. For others, integration implied coexistence of minority cultures and majority ones in order to have multicultural society. In the meantime, citizens of several European cities elected Muslims as their mayors. Among these cities is London, the third European city in terms of the number of inhabitants.[2]

1 Immigration into European countries is a phenomenon that is certainly older than the second half of the 20th century and the need for reconstruction following World War II. For example, intense immigration into France began after World War I. "It was not only about meeting the needs of the economy or about filling the positions abandoned by local population, but also about compensating for the devastating effects that the two world wars had on the population, or simply about mitigating the speedy and long-lasting natality decrease (except during a short baby-boom after World War II)." (See: Catherine Halpern, Jean-Claude Ruano-Borbalan (Eds.) (2009) Identitet(i) [Identité(s)], Beograd: CLIO, p. 312.

2 In 1968, Amanullah and his wife Sehrun came from Pakistan to the United Kingdom. Amanullah found a job and worked as a bus driver. Now, in 2018, his son Sadiq Khan is Mayor of London and a prominent Labour Party member. Prior to that, he was a member of the House of Commons of the UK Parliament.

II

Identity is simultaneously an individual and a collective phenomenon that involves taking over new elements and preserving old ones, where some elements may be more important than others, which implies that their mutual hierarchisation is not excluded or permanently set. The process of creating an identity is paradoxical because it is based on one's ability to present one to others, which further implies that the identity not only changes its constituent parts but also survives only because of its ability of reconfiguration.[3]

Jann Assmann describes identity as a matter of consciousness, or bringing an otherwise unconscious image of the self to the reflexive level. This applies both to individual and to collective life. I am only a person, says he, to the extent that I know myself to be one, and in exactly the same way, a group – whether it be a tribe, race, or nation – can only be itself to the degree in which it understands, visualizes, and represents itself as such.[4] The cultural identity means

3 Branimir Stojković, (2008) Kulturni identitet Evrope [European Cultural Identity], Beograd: JP Službeni glasnik, pp. 24-25.

4 "Individual identity is the coherent self-image that builds itself up in the consciousness of the individual through features that (a) distinguish them significantly from everyone else and (b) remain constant across the various phases of their development. It is the awareness, beginning with the constant motif of one's own body, of an irreducible self that is unmistakable and irreplaceable. Personal identity, on the other hand, is the embodiment of all of the roles, qualities, and talents that give the individual his own special place in the social network. Individual identity relates to the contingencies of life, incorporating such key elements as birth and death, physical existence, and basic needs. Personal identity relates to social accountability and recognition. Both aspects of the "I" identity are determined sociogenically and culturally, and both processes – individuation and socialization – follow culturally prescribed paths. They arise from a consciousness that is formed and determined by the language, ideas, norms, and values of a particular time and culture. Thus, in the sense of the first thesis, society is not a powerful opponent for the individual; instead, it is a constitutive element of the self. Society is not a dimension mightier than the individual, but represents a constituent element of the self. Identity, including that of the "I", is always a social construct, and as such it is always cultural. The distinction between first-person singular and first-person plural identities should therefore not be seen as one between natural growth and cultural construction. There is no such thing as an identity that grows naturally. There is, however, a difference in so far as the collective identity – unlike the personal – has no link with such natural factors as the body; and what we call the "social body" does not exist as a visible, tangible reality. The elements of

collective consciousness, a sense of belonging based on the awareness of certain shared features such as language, race, territory, religion, etc. that, in a given situation, are the basis of identification."[5] However, any essentialization of identity is wrong, since the identity is a result of the process of "permanent hibridization" and numerous interactions.[6] It is always composed of many layers. Seldom, and only in special circumstances – usually in a crisis, there is a need to select and emphasise one, repressing other layers.[7] Whether someone will declare oneself as European or Bosnia, as Italian or German, etc. depends on who the other party is and where they are. Our European identity may seem important in our communication with non-European persons and institutions, and our national one in

collective identity are underpinned by factors that are purely symbolic, and the social body is simply a metaphor – an imaginary construct. As such, however, it has its own position in reality.The collective or "we" identity is the image that a group has of itself and with which its members associate them-selves. It therefore has no existence of its own, but comes into being through recognition by its participating individuals. It is as strong or as weak as its presence in the consciousness of its members and its motivating influence on their thoughts and actions." (See: Jan Assmann (2005) Kulturno pamćenje [Cultural memory], Zenica: Vrijeme, pp. 153-155).

5 Branimir Stojković, op.cit., p. 21.

6 Iver B. Neumann (2011) Upotrebe drugog: „Istok" u formiranju evropskog identiteta [Uses of the Other. The 'East' in European Identity Formation], Beograd: Službeni glasnik i Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku, pp. 232-233.

7 To illustrate this, we may mention a famous writer. Franz Kafka, "as a Jew, did not entirely belong in the Christian world. As an indifferent Jew – which he essentially was – did not entirely belong with the Jews. As a German-speaking man, he was not entirely Czech. As a German-speaking Jew, he did not entirely belong with the Czech Germans. As Czech, not entirely with Austria." (See: Günther Anders, Kafka – pro et Contra (osnovi spora) [Kafka, pro and contra. The Trial Records.], Beograd: Rogoz, 1985, p. 40); Amin Maalouf points out the need to always have in mind such multiple belonging, i.e., that the identity is not a closed, static category; rather, it is always dynamic, impregnating new elements and supressing others or, at least, diminishing their meaning. There is a certain hierarchy among the constituent parts of an identity, but its character is volatile. According to Maalouf, we can see a metamorphosis of identity, i.e., the self-perception changes depending on which element of the identity is placed in the centre, or which aspect of the identity is being emphasised (Amin Maalouf (2002) U ime identiteta [In the Name of Identity], Zagreb: Prometej.

communication with Europeans of other nationalities.[8]

The relationship towards the other is a constituent element of the identity, and only in relation to the other is self-awareness possible. Oskar Lafontaine points out that borders belong to the determination of people's identities, as the self-identity can be defined only in distinguishing it from the non-identical. As for cultural and spiritual borders, one's own culture is measured against another one, one's own cultural identity is confronted with a different culture, thus being enriched, while crossing borders becomes a positive human experience.[9]

Pierre Centlivres enriches the notion of identity by emphasising two other important dimensions, in addition to the historic one. Thus, he distinguishes among three different aspects of it: a) historical (identity based on heritage) grounded primarily in past events important for the community; b) projective identity based on both historical and projective experiences, representing a developed image of the future that, sometimes but not always, starts from the past; c) experienced identity is a reflection of everyday life and the contemporary life: it can include historical, projective and heritage-based elements.[10]

III

The words Europe and/or European trigger a number of associations, such as those relating to geography, imperialism, colonialism, culture, industrial development, etc. However, as S. J. Woolf points out, the historical and cultural borders of Europe do not match the geographical picture emerging in atlases of the early 19th century. If we go back to what is usually considered the sources of European civilisation, we can see that the Greco-Roman civilisation and the Judeo-Christian monotheism developed within Mediterranean empires stretching all the way to the Middle East and North Africa, while merely crossing beyond the Alps to the north and west of the European continent. Europe was, at best, a mere periphery. It first officially emerges in history with the proclamation

8 Stuart J. Woolf, Europa: jedna povijest, jedan identitet? [Europe: single history, single identity?], in: Furio Cerutti /Ed./ (2006.) Identitet i politika [Identità e politica], Zagreb: Politička kultura, p. 280.

9 Branimir Stojković, op. cit., p. 23.

10 Branimir Stojković, op. cit., p. 23.

of the Holy Roman Empire by Charlemagne in the year 800. However, its south-west, or the Iberian Peninsula, was held by Arabs as long as the end of 15th century, while its south-east by the Ottoman Turks several centuries later.[11] Its north-east border at the Urals was drawn only in the 18th century. In anthropological terms, the idea of Europe as a single entity could only have been formed in relation to what was non-European, only through an image of "the other". According to Edward Said, this is why 'Orientalism' was developed as a European cultural creation. By 'orientalising' non-European space, European intellectuals constructed a unifying model of civilisation that was supposed to ensure future grounds for proving the existence of a single identity and for justifying the aggressive European politics.[12]

European self-understanding and the perception of Europe from the outside are not the same today relative to those of half a century ago or in the early 20th century. This half of the century saw decolonisation, cold-war division of Europe, decline of Europe as the centre of the world, as well as globalisation and strengthening of the European Union as a supranational fact, which are important points for understanding the European identity.

When one uses the term European in terms of identity, one should have in mind that it does not imply the same when used by a Frenchman, a Hungarian or a Romanian, for example. Many Frenchmen, just as other West Europeans, do not think they share the same identity with Hungarians or Romanians and other peoples east of the Oder–Neisse line, since anything east of this line is some other Europe.[13] Any attempt to reduce Europe to a single identity, a pure and unique identity, is doomed to fail. Quite the contrary, Europe is made of a myriad of cultural identities that have always existed and that will continue to exist in future. There is no use of searching for

11 Iver B. Neumann points at a significant difference in perceiving Arabs and Ottoman Turks. Saracens or Arabs in Spain were 'the other' of the Christian world, i.e., they were seen through the lens of religion. Europe was understood and interpreted as a 'Christian world'. The Ottoman Empire was perceived as a threat to Europe that was now gaining political significance. The factor of 'Russia' was also an important element of creating the European identity. See: Iver B. Neumann, op. cit., pp. 61-83 and 85-130.

12 Stuart J. Woolf, Europa: jedna povijest, jedan identitet?, in: Furio Cerutti /Ed./, Identitet i politika, pp. 261-263; Iver B. Neumann, op.cit.

13 Henri Mendras (2004.) Europa i Europljani: sociologija zapadne Europe [L'Europe des européens. Sociologie de l'Europe occidentale], Zagreb: Masmedia, p. 9

the core of a cultural identity that would include all Europeans. This was best seen during the discussion about identity when preparing the European Union Constitution.[14]

If we look at the 20th century, as Hartmut Kaelble points out, the first aspect of the Europeans' self-perception is the one of their, European, superiority to all others, "based on an advanced European mentality or even biological characteristics."[15] European supremacy is seen as a comprehensive, cultural, political, military, economic and scientific supremacy simultaneously, as supremacy in terms of innovativeness and knowledge, economic performance, religious monolithism, individual autonomy, lifestyle sophistication, quality of life, etc. This concept reached the peak of its popularity in late 19th and early 20th centuries, and no one thought that other civilisations could reach the European level of modernity or that this supremacy could ever see its decline. Another viewpoint implies the position of endangered Europe. This perception of relationships among civilisations implies their natural antagonistic relationship, constant clashes and mutual conflicts. Such position precludes a possibility of mutual understanding and mutual enrichment. This standpoint dominated a major part of the 20th century and was, to a lesser degree, present even to the end of the century. The next one regarded Europe as part of the global modernisation. This viewpoint does not include positions about European superiority or endangered Europe anymore but, rather, those about Europe as part of the universal modernisation of the world and part of a modern First World where Europe is already not in the first position. Such leadership is not considered eternal. On the contrary, the role of modern societies is to encourage modernisation processes in other societies through education, capital investments and transfer of innovations. The fourth viewpoint regards Europe as one of many civilisations. This standpoint does not view Europe in terms of superiority or inferiority but of "participation in an exchange of ideas, goods, people and lifestyles." The final one among a number of Europeans' perceptions of themselves, analysed by Hartmut Kaelble, concerns European unity in differences. It is oriented towards internal introspection, without

14 Thomas Meyer (2009) Identitet Evrope, Beograd: IP „Albatros plus" & JP „Službeni glasnik", pp. 13-58.

15 Hartmut Kaelble, European Self-Understanding in the Twentieth Century, in: Klaus Eder and Willfried Spohn /Ed./ (2005) Collective Memory and European Identity: The Effects of Integration and Enlargement, Aldershot-Burlington: Ashgate, p. 19.

any comparisons with others. According to those arguing for this view, Europe has much more internal differences than any other civilisation and they, along with internal competitiveness, were the main reason behind European innovations and the pioneering global role that Europe played in the early modern age.[16]

Chronologically speaking, it is possible to distinguish among at least three stages that European self-understanding went through. The first stage lasted until World War One, the second from WWI to 1960s and the third following 1960s. The first stage saw a dynamic debate comparing European modernity with that of the United States of America. In this period there was a fear of American values and their possibly destructive effect on European ones. The American and European mentalities were understood to be completely different, just as their approaches to modern life were perceived to be. In early 20th century, the USA population was equal to that of the most populated European countries, the productivity of the US economy surpasses that of many European countries, and it became obvious that Japan, as an East Asian country, began to grow into a non-European power. However, in this period the idea of European supremacy was still alive. The second stage, between 1918 and 1960, comprises the most serious and fundamental crises of the European self-perception. It was crucially influenced by severe consequences of the two world wars, a decline of living standard and the increasingly obvious American economic and cultural supremacy, as well as fear of the Soviet communist and military threat. It was in this period that most Europeans realised that the economic, political and military supremacy of Europe was definitely gone. The third stage, following 1960s, was the time of a realistic perception of Europe with all its advantages and drawbacks. The focus was on political aspects, stabilisation, democratisation and peace, as well as a high living standard and social security. Finally, with all its weaknesses, the European Union functioned as a real political entity.[17]

Still, Europe is a conglomerate of different identities. For instance, certain arguments used by Norwegian opponents to Norway's accession to the EU were related to the fact that people in the EU were not interested in issues that meant a lot to the Norwegians, such as care about children, nature, social justice and gender equality. The accession to the EU, they thought, would reduce the level of this care

16 Ibid., pp. 19-21.

17 Ibid., pp. 22-27.

to the EU level.[18] Moreover, within the borders of certain countries, there are significant differences as to the identity of inhabitants of certain regions. We are going to give the example of Germany and the way Klaus Roth and Juliana Roth speak about it.[19] After the unification of Germany in 1990, it was expected that those Germans who had lived under a totalitarian communist regime in the east of the country for almost half a century would be thrilled to discard the entire socialist heritage. "However, it soon became clear that the economic and mental damage caused by the socialist regime was much more severe and that people on the two sides of the Iron Curtain and Berlin belonged to one nation in abstract terms alone."[20] During the period of separation, which lasted several decades only, and after living in two different socioeconomic systems, they formed hugely different views of life and two versions of the same national culture. West Germans displayed impatience as their countrymen were slow to abandon their socialist habits. East Germans were increasingly critical of the Western capitalism, in which they faced unemployment and social injustice. They soon produced mutual stereotypes with collective names 'Ossi', i.e., East Germans, and 'Wessi', i.e., West Germans. The West German stereotype portrays an Ossi as a passive, lazy, incompetent provincial who is endlessly complaining about something. The East German stereotype sees a typical Wessi as arrogant, distanced, cold, covertly hypocritical, immoral, egocentric and cunning.[21] It may be argued that forty years of mutual isolation of East Germany and West Germany generated different individual and collective experiences that will be difficult to fully overcome.

Who is unmistakeably and undeniably European? Everyone with an EU member passport? However, many without such a passport claim to be European. They relate their Europeanism to cultural identifiers such as Western Christianity or haring a 'common' history. How is it possible then to make a decision as to who should be considered

18 Marianne Gullestad, Postavljanje granica [Setting Boundaries], in: Åke Daun & Sören Janson /Eds./ (2004) Europljani: kultura i identitet [Europeans: Essays on Culture and Identity], Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, p. 126.

19 Klaus Roth and Juliana Roth, Jedna zemlja- dvije kulture? [One Country - Two Cultures? Germany After Unification], in: Åke Daun & Sören Janson /Eds./ (2004) Europljani: kultura i identitet [Europeans: Essays on Culture and Identity], Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, p. 177.

20 Ibid., 178-179.

21 Ibid., 181.

European? In addition to knowing who Europeans are, it should be decided which Europeans are entitled to define themselves as the European 'core'.[22]

On the other hand, certain surveys of public opinion in European countries show how Europeans rank their values. According to David Blake's research, European values can be listed in the following order according to their importance: family, freedom, human rights, equality, democracy, labour, culture, solidarity, marriage. These are followed by the values of nations, free entrepreneurship and, finally, money and religion. Considering that they are accepted by the population of all the European countries included in the research (Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain), they can be said to have a cohesive function and to contribute to the development of European society.[23] This research does not deny regional differences, nor differences among individual countries.

IV

Just as Europe is not a monolithic entity, so too Muslims-Europeans are a very heterogenous population.[24] Differences among them are manifold: ethnic, linguistic, ideological and even theological. Certain countries mostly have immigrants from some regions. Thus, most Muslims in the United Kingdom are originally from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, i.e., from countries that were British colonies. Most Muslims in France are originally from former French colonies, namely North African countries. Most Muslims in Germany are originally from Turkey and the Balkans. However, their second and third generations

22 Klaus Eder, Remembering National Memories Together: The Formation of a Transnational Identity in Europe, in: Klaus Eder and Willfried Spohn (Eds.) (2005) Collective Memory and European Identity: The Effects of Integration and Enlargement, Aldershot-Burlington: Ashgate, str. 198.

23 David Blake, "A Common Culture, a Common Currency (Exclusive Poll on How the People of Europe Really See Their Future)", See: Branimir Stojković, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

24 When this paper and literature in general mention Muslims in Europe, they refer to Muslims that immigrated to a European country. We are not talking here about indigenous European peoples of Islamic faith, such as Bosniaks, Albanians, Bulgarians or Turks. The main ideas about the identity of Muslims in Europe are expressed in the book published in 2012 (second edition 2015) Položaj muslimana u Evropskoj uniji [Position of Muslims in the European Union], Sarajevo: Dobra knjiga.

– those who were born in Europe, who speak the language of their new homeland, who were educated and started their careers in Europe – build their lives as Europeans, or as UK, German, French citizens or those of any other European country. Moreover, for members of the third generation, the issue of integration seems out of place. Even if it was something that applied to their parents, more and more of them believe it is quite unreasonable to talk en bloc about integration. It would only make sense to talk about the integration of certain marginalised, deprived or (self-)isolated groups, which certainly exist in all European countries.

In her text on the immigration of Muslims to the West in the 20th century and the approach of European countries to immigration, Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad points out three ways of approaching them in European societies. The first is the foreign labour model, mostly dominant in Germanic societies (Germany, Austria and Switzerland). Immigrants' stay was considered temporary only. The relevant governments did nothing to integrate them into the new environment, regardless of the fact that their children were born and grew up in these countries, without ever desiring to go back to their parents' countries. The second model is that od assimilation and is implemented in France. Immigrants wishing to become French nationals are required to abandon the adherence to their inherited cultural, religious, political and ideological tradition, and to accept and fit into the generally accepted reality and community of the ruling system. Such policy aims at assimilating each Muslim economically and socially. The third model is that of an ethnic minority, being dominant in its different forms in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxemburg and Scandinavia. Within this model it is accepted that an immigrant has a different civilisation identity, which the immigrant can preserve in the new environment and acct in accordance with it.[25]

Will Kymlicka says that the multiculturalism of countries is created in two ways. The first one implies the incorporation of all the existing self-governing and territorially concentrated nations as "communities more or less institutionally completed in a given territory, with their own languages and particular histories," into the composition of a larger state, which is the case with, e.g., Indians, Porto Ricans and other indigenous peoples in the USA or other

25 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, „Globalizacija islama: povratak muslimana na Zapad" [The globalization of Islam: the return of Muslims to the West], in: John L. Esposito /Ed./ (2005.) Oksfordska historija islama [The Oxford History of Islam], Živinice: Selsebil, pp. 580-581.

countries that used colonisation or another way to include in their own borders different self-governing peoples that were subsequently minoritized. Kymlicka calls such states multinational states. Another source of cultural diversity is individual (or familial) migration. Such immigrants frequently form associations that Kymlicka calls ethnic groups, and states that have such groups polyethnic states. Both cases imply multicultural states but with different origins and contents of multiculturalism.[26] Kymlicka emphasises that integration is a two-sided process. A successful integration means that "society should also adjust to immigrants, not only immigrants to society. Facilitating integration requires, in the first place, putting great efforts into fighting against prejudice and discrimination. This implies not only the rigorous strengthening of antidiscrimination laws bit also changes to the way immigrants are portrayed in school textbooks, government documents and the media."[27]

One of the most famous opponents of the notion of multiculturalism is certainly Bassam Tibi, German political scientist of Syrian origin. He believes that multiculturalism is not a good model for the integration of Muslims, since society is becoming divided, with 'parallel societies' being created in one country, which leads to segregation and ghettoization of the minority community, which in this case is the Muslim community.[28] Instead of multiculturalism, Tibi argues for the idea of cultural pluralism, whereby he implies the acceptance of secular democracy, individual human rights, secular tolerance and civil society.[29] Political integration of Muslims, which implies adopting these values, is the best response to the challenges that Muslims in Europe are facing, believes Tibi. Unlike political integration, Tibi holds that requests for assimilation in terms of negating cultural identity are not justified. In this regard, he underlines three aspects of identity. Thus, "in terms of religion and culture, I am a Euro-Muslim, ethnically I am a Damascene Arab, and politically I am a citizen of

26 Will Kymlicka (2004) Multikulturalizam: multikulturno građanstvo [Multiculturalism: Multicultural Citizenship], Podgorica-Zagreb: CID-Jesenski i Turk, pp. 21-26.

27 Will Kymlicka, op. cit., p. 141.

28 Bassam Tibi, Muslim Migrants in Europe: Between Euro-Islam and Ghettoization, in Nezar, AlSayyad and Manual Castells, (Eds.) (2002) Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization, Lanham-Boulder-New York-Oxford: Lexington Books, p. 43.

29 Bassam Tibi, op. cit., p. 48.

Germany. I believe that a combination of these three identities is feasible within cultural pluralism and political integration."[30]

Tariq Ramadan offered a developed concept of identity and integration of Muslims in European societies. Although every European state has different social, cultural and legal grounds in terms of regulating the status of Muslim communities, there is a det of rights that are guaranteed in all European states and that are extremely important prerequisites for the integration of Muslims into European societies. Ramadan points out the following five rights. The first is the right to practice Islam. Muslims who live in European countries can quite freely practice the main Islamic rituals. The second is the right to education. "For Muslims, according to one of the most important principles of their religion, access to education is an imperative. The principle of mandatory education for all children enables Muslims to apply a well-known Hadith: 'Seeking knowledge is an obligation upon every Muslim (both men and women).'" The third is the right to establish organisations. This right has enabled the establishment of a number of Muslim organisations: religious, cultural and other organisations across Europe. The fourth right is the right to autonomous representation. A lack of unified organisations at the national level and strong associations at the European level is a result of weaknesses of Muslims themselves and of multiple differences or even divisions among them. The fifth one is the right to legal protection. Muslims, just as all other citizens, are entitled to approach judicial authorities to protect their individual or collective rights. [31]These rights are of great importance for the integration of Muslims in European societies. However, Ramadan states that one should never neglect the difficulties that Muslims also face. Among them are issues related to preserving and developing spirituality in modern society, where the notion of secularism, as well as that of separation between the private and public spheres, of between religion and state is often understood and interpreted as a complete absence of religiousness.[32]

According to Ramadan, we can talk about three models of accommodation: assimilation, isolation and integration. Assimilation implies a process in which religious identity is neglected, which

30 Bassam Tibi, op. cit., p. 47.

31 Tariq Ramadan (2002.) Biti evropski musliman [To be a European Muslim], Sarajevo: Udruženje Ilmijje Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, str. 172-174.

32 Tariq Ramadan, op. cit., str. 176.

means to be "a European Muslim without Islam". An opposite process is the one of social (self-)isolation from a broader society, which leads to being a Muslim "in Europe but apart from Europe". The third model is that of integration, which implies 'cohabitation' of two equal constituents of the European Muslim identity: the person's religious identity answering the question of a general purpose, and their European social, cultural and political context.[33] Ramadan dismisses as unacceptable the models of assimilation (Muslims without Islam), on the one hand, and of isolation (living in Europe but apart from Europe) on the other, arguing for a middle solution, i.e., the integration model.

Regardless of a number of difficulties in the process of integration, the process implies mutual adjustment and adaptation. Muslim adjust to European institutions, while the governments of European countries implement, faster or slower, legislative reforms aiming at facilitation immigrants' adaptation and integration. Finally, no European society, let alone a government, perceives Muslims as a temporary phenomenon any longer but, rather, as a reality of the entire social landscape of a given country.

One of the fundamental issues regarding Muslims as a new reality of Europe is whether European countries individually and the European Union as a supranational organisation will remain consistent when separating the public and private spheres, or relating cultural identity primarily to the private sphere and political identity to the public one, as well as whether European identity will be open towards the world or will be the old closed identity of 'the stronghold of Europe'?

33 Tariq Ramadan, op. cit., str. 226.

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